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The popular uprisings that swept Egypt and Tunisia this winter were remarkably 
similar, but their immediate outcomes have been quite different. In Tunisia, 
civilian politicians and technocrats quickly took the helm of the country in the 
wake of the revolution. In Egypt, by contrast, the military’s Supreme Council is 
slated to rule the nation for six months, and whether it stays in power or returns 
to the barracks, it will surely try to ensure that civilians do not subordinate its role 
in politics. Given the nature and history of the two countries’ militaries, this 
divergence is not surprising. Still, Egypt’s military may not have the stranglehold 
on power that many think, and a real Tunisian solution -- a civilian government 
free of military involvement -- could form in Egypt as well. 
 
Under President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisia was a police state. The 
president relied on his handpicked security and intelligence forces in the Interior 
Ministry to maintain his rule. Mistrustful of large militaries, he purposefully 
ensured the weakness of the army. With merely 50,000 in uniform, the army, as 
a proportion of the population, is among the smallest in the Arab world. Denied 
significant amounts of the foreign assistance that came into Tunisia, 
undersupplied, poorly equipped, and excluded from Ben Ali’s patronage network, 
it was not invested in the regime. Meanwhile, over the past few decades, Ben Ali 
had effectively placed it under U.S. tutelage, where it was given training and 
modest arms transfers. This was a hedge against the French, who retained some 
influence over the police after Tunisian independence. They supplied and trained 
the security and intelligence forces, and even helped the government suppress 
an uprising in 1955. U.S. involvement with the military, Ben Ali supposed, would 
prevent the French from having a monopoly of influence over his country’s 
means of coercion. At the same time, it meant that the army, which already had 
little loyalty to Ben Ali and no economic interest in maintaining his regime, 
became the one well-trained and highly professional force in the country. 
 
It is not surprising, then, that when Ben Ali ordered the Tunisian army’s chief of 
staff, Rachid Ammar, to fire on the protesters as the Jasmine Revolution gained 
momentum, the general refused. Likewise, Ben Ali’s order to dismiss Ammar was 
ignored. The military instead turned its guns on the security and intelligence 
forces and the gangs of hooligans that Ben Ali loyalists had sent into the streets 
to sow panic. The French foreign minister, of course, suggested that France 
reinforce the police to help Ben Ali suppress the crowds. The police, however, 
were not reinforced, and Ben Ali, left without protection, had no choice but to flee. 
Soon after, Ammar conspicuously stepped aside to allow for the creation of a 
new civilian government. 
 
By contrast, former President Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt was a military state to 
which the police were subordinate. Although outnumbering military troops three 
to one (a staggering 1.5 million to 450,000), the security and police forces were 
underequipped, poorly paid, and viewed with contempt by the military. And unlike 
in Tunisia, the Egyptian military was allowed -- indeed encouraged -- to develop 
its own economic empire, which alleviated some of the institution’s expenses for 
the government and, more important, generated a patronage network to buy the 
loyalty of the officer corps. 
 
Since the military was considered above such matters as crowd control, Mubarak 
called on the security and intelligence forces to subdue the protests when they 
erupted in Cairo. Those forces soon began to crack, creating a security vacuum 
into which the government poured thugs, officers out of uniform, and hired 
criminals. Unlike the Tunisian army in comparable circumstances, the Egyptian 
military stood aside, failing to protect civilians. Only when it became clear that 
Mubarak’s tactics had failed, did it step in. On February 11, the Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces assumed control of the country and immediately began 
issuing proclamations as the new de facto government. 
 
It appears that the Egyptian military has won the cake, at least for the time being, 
but eating it is going to be difficult. Although its size and strength are widely 
recognized, the Egyptian army is not the tight professional force that many 
consider it to be. It is bloated and its officer core is indulged, having been 
fattened on Mubarak’s patronage. Its training is desultory, maintenance of its 
equipment is profoundly inadequate, and it is dependent on the United States for 
funding and logistical support. But even weapons systems the United States has 
given the Egyptian army, such as F-16s and M1A1 tanks, are underutilized. 
Many are also comparatively ineffective, in part because Minister of Defense 
Muhammad Tantawi, acting on behalf of Mubarak, denied them vital, state-of-
the-art communication capacities. He did so to impede lateral communications 
within the officer corps and to prevent interoperability with nominally allied forces, 
including those of friendly Arab countries. The raison d’être of the military was 
always to support the Mubarak regime, not defend the nation. 
 
As presently constituted, the military will also not be able to meet many of the 
protesters’ demands. It cannot allow the core of the anti-Mubarak movement, 
such as the National Association for Change associated with Muhammad El 
Baradei, to play a leading role in forming a new government. Nor can it allow a 
parliament to have real power. The anti-Mubarak opposition and an empowered 
legislative branch would seek at least an oversight role and ultimately try to 
subordinate the military to the civilian government. This would be unacceptable 
to the military, which knows that its patronage network and economic influence 
would dry up if civilians took control. It will also try to deny calls for a full-scale 
investigation into the “economic crimes” of the ancien régime, for it has been 
involved in many of them. 
 
But there has been a revolution, and re-imposing military control behind a civilian 
facade will now be extremely difficult, especially since the opposition seems to 
see through the military’s strategies. The opposition’s massive gathering in Tahrir 
Square on February 18, one week after Mubarak’s ouster, for example, was a 
warning that it would force the military to share power with civilians. For its part, 
the military will likely try to maintain power and justify crackdowns by appealing to 
the need for order; steer a fellow traveler into the presidency, such as Amr 
Moussa, an Egyptian diplomat and the current secretary-general of the Arab 
League, or the current prime minister and a former general, Ahmad Shafiq; limit 
constitutional changes aimed at achieving a more democratic balance of power 
between the executive and legislative branches; and orchestrate economic show 
trials. 
 
But Egypt faces dire economic conditions, and the military may already be 
jeopardizing the country’s future and discouraging foreign direct investment by 
targeting some of the old regime’s liberal economic elite, such as the former 
minister of trade and industry, Rachid Mohamed Rachid. The military high 
command may try to counter the lack of investment by calling for renewed 
economic nationalism, but that will condemn Egypt to economic stagnation, 
similar to that which it experienced in the mid-1960s. In addition to mobilizing the 
middle class seeking freedom and jobs, the revolution energized the poor, who 
joined in the protests to demand dignity, justice, and bread. If the economy 
worsens and the military overstays its welcome, the Egyptian people may well 
return to the streets. 
 
Established military rule in Egypt is certainly not in the Egyptian people’s interest, 
but neither is it in the United States’ or any other country’s interest. It would be 
politically unstable in the short term, and over the longer haul would likely lead to 
a repetition of this past month’s events. The United States must encourage the 
institutionalized political participation of those who drove -- and are still driving -- 
the revolution. And rather than continuing to support the military, as the Obama 
administration has promised to do, the United States needs to signal that an 
overgrown, overfed, and largely useless Egyptian military is not acceptable. Aid 
the United States does send should be geared toward helping the Egyptian 
military deal with real national security interests, such as disaster relief, air and 
sea rescue, and cooperative engagement with allied military forces. And, as in 
the case of Tunisia, U.S. training certainly has a role to play. Through 
professional military education, the United States can assist Egypt’s military in 
developing professional norms, which are supportive of civil-military relations 
within a democratic framework. To recall a chant inciting Cairo’s January 25 
movement: “Tunisia is the solution.” 
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